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British Property Law
and Human Rights:
Possible Lessons from
the United States
Constitution
Michael J. Percy*
I. Introduction
The adoption of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA)1 has "brought home" the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (Convention) 2 to British domestic law. 3 Historically, property lawyers
in the United Kingdom ignored any possible human rights aspects of their work.4
This was probably an error5 since the Convention has been enforceable in Great
Britain since 1966,6 but the prevailing opinion was that British law, in practice,
already protected the applicable human rights and so the incorporation of the
Michael Percy received his J.D. from Santa Clara University in May 2007. He also has a
B.A. Architecture from University of California, Berkeley and a Masters of Urban Planning
from San Jose State University. Prior to entering law school, Mr. Percy was Principal City
Planner for Mountain View, California. Mr. Percy wishes to thank Roger Smith of
Magdelain College, Oxford for inspiring this Comment, and the editors of the S.C.U.
Journal of International Law for their assistance.
I. Human Rights Act 1998, 1998 Chapter 42 (United Kingdom).
2. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (Council of Europe) [hereinafter Convention].
3. Richard Buxton, The Human Rights Act and Private Law, 116 L.Q.R. 48, 49 - 50 (Jan.,
2000).
4. Jean Howell, Land and Human Rights, 1999 CONY. & PROP. LAW. 287, 287 (Jul./Aug.
1999).
5. Id.
6. Vincent Pace, Partial Entrenchment of a Bill of Rights: The Canadian Model Offers a
Viable Solution to the United Kingdom's Bill of Rights Debate, 13 CONN. J. INT'L L. 149,
158 n. 56. (While domestic courts in the UK could not enforce the Convention prior to the
HRA, British citizens could seek enforcement of the Convention by bringing an action
before the European Court of Human Rights, at least against government actions.).
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Convention would have little impact.7 Whatever the impact of the Convention in
Great Britain before the HRA, it is clear that it must be taken into account now that
the HRA is British law.
Some British commentators have argued that the only possible application of
the HRA would involve a direct violation of an individual's Convention rights by
the government, the so-called "vertical" impact.8 This "vertical" impact results
from Section 6 of the HRA which requires that any government action must be
consistent with the Convention.9 Other commentators argue that the adoption of
the HRA also applies the Convention to suits between individuals when the cause
of action involves violation of their human rights, the so-called "horizontal
effect."' It has been argued that the "horizontal" impact also results from HRA
Section 6, which makes it unlawful for any public authority, specifically including
the courts, to act incompatibly with the Convention, arguably including application
of common law or statute to the adjudication of a dispute." Separately, it is argued
that HRA Section 3, which requires British courts to interpret statutes and common
law to be consistent with the Convention also results in a horizontal effect.
12
Whether the HRA in fact applies to disputes between private parties is still being
hotly debated, but it is clear that the Convention does apply, vertically, to
governmental actions. 3
The amount of impact in either dimension will depend on the degree of
difference between existing British law and the human rights requirements of the
Convention. 14 But the amount of the horizontal impact depends on the degree to
which British courts, as a public authority, are determined to have an obligation to
apply the Convention when applying the law to a specific private party dispute.1
5
The cases considered shortly after the adoption of the HRA found only the
narrow, vertical application.16 However, commentators as reputable as the Lord
Chancellor, Lord Irvine of Lairg,17 noted early on that the HRA and its
7. Buxton, supra note 3 at 61.
8. Id. at 48.
9. Richard Clayton, Developing Principles for Human Rights, 2 E.H.R.L.R. 175, 181 (2002).
10. William Wade, Horizons of Horizontality, 116 L.Q.R. 217, 217 (Apr. 2000).
11. Id.
12. Nicholas Bamforth, The True "Horizontal Effect" of the Human Rights Act 1998, 117 LQR
34, 34 (2000).
13. ROGER J. SMITH, PROPERTY LAW, 15-17 (Pearson Education Ltd., 5th ed. 2005).
14. Buxton, supra note 3, at 49 n.8.
15. Id. at 50.
16. Charles Harpum, Property Law - The Human Rights Dimension: Part 2, 4(2) LANDLORD &
TENANT R. 29, 29 (2000).
17. The Lord Chancellor is the head of Great Britain's judiciary, responsible for the
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incorporated human rights from the Convention may have a fairly broad impact
since "future English judges will have at hand a clear legislative statement, a single
source that will raise the prominence of human rights throughout English law."'
'8
This Comment will argue that a study of how human rights provisions of the
United States Constitution have impacted American property law will enrich the
HRA development of British property law, and, likely, advance the broad
application of the HRA, as Lord Chancellor suggested. While not analyzing in-
depth the ways the human rights provisions of the American Constitution have
affected property law in America, this Comment will illustrate, by example, how
property law and human rights issues now being explored under the HRA have
already been addressed in the United States. It is argued that America's
constitutional experience indicates that the potential impact of the Convention on
British property law will be significantly greater than British commentators expect.
This Comment will first examine the history of the Convention on Human
Rights in Great Britain, including examples of cases from both the European Court
of Human Rights (the Strasbourg court) and British courts under Convention. The
example cases will focus on four subject areas where Convention in Great Britain
and the Bill of Rights in the United States may affect (or have affected, in the case
of the United States) the outcome of property law disputes: Regulatory Takings,
Discrimination, Due Process, and Adverse Possession.' 9 Secondly, this Comment
will compare the role of the Constitution in American law in protecting human
rights to the protection offered by the "sovereign Parliament '20 structure of British
law, and the potential for change in Great Britain's legal structure that has been
triggered by adoption of the HRA. This Comment will conclude with a discussion
of how a study of American constitutional law may inform consideration of current
British property law issues.
development and implementation of government policy on the legal system and for
administration of the courts. The Lord Chancellor also presides over the House of Lords,
one of the two Houses of the British Parliament. Lord Irvine served as Lord Chancellor
from 1997 to 2003. See "Lord Chancellor", http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi /uk-politics/ 82530.
stm (last visited Mar. 22, 2007).
18. LORD IRVINE OF LAIRG, THE COMMON ORIGINS OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW,
reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 217 (2003) [hereinafter LORD IRVINE]. (The Common Origins of
English and American Law was originally published as "Millennium Lecture in The
English Legal System in the 21 st Century" by the Honorable Society of the Inner Temple.)
19. See DEBORAH ROOK, PROPERTY LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Blackstone Press 2001).
These topic areas were suggested by the discussion in the chapter entitled "Implications of
the HRA 1998 on Property Law."
20. LORD IRVINE, supra note 18, at 225.
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II. Background - Convention on Human Rights and the HRA
A. History of the European Convention on Human Rights in Great Britain
The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was
created shortly after the end of World War I121 in reaction to the atrocities that had
occurred during that war.22 The Convention contains an enforcement procedure
that allows citizens to bring grievances to the European Court of Human Rights in
23Strasbourg, France. Although Great Britain was a signatory to the Convention,
the Convention had little direct legal effect on British law since treaties in Great
Britain are not self-executing. 24 It was not until 1966 that the United Kingdom
25allowed its citizens to seek enforcement of human rights in the Strasbourg court.
Further, until the HRA became effective in October 2000, domestic courts in Great
26Britain could not directly enforce the Convention. British citizens could only file
a grievance in Strasbourg, but only after the House of Lords, Great Britain's
highest appellate court, had adjudicated the case. As a result, prior to adoption of
the HRA, the impact of the Convention on British domestic courts considering
property cases was minimal,28 even though alleged failures by the British
government to protect Convention rights could be appealed to Strasbourg.
2 9
Some commentators have suggested that the Convention had this minimal direct
impact because the concepts on which the Convention is based are already
represented in Great Britain's common law. 30 However, other commentators argue
that the large number of cases brought against Great Britain in the Strasbourg court
strongly suggest that the status quo in British law has "too often failed to protect
21. The Convention, supra note 2, was adopted by the eight original members of the Council of
Europe on November 4, 1950, and was ratified by England, a Council member, in 1951.
22. Cherie Booth and Max Du Plessis, Home Alone? The US Supreme Court and International
and Transnational Judicial Learning, 2 E.H.R.L.R 127, 130 (2005).
23. Pace, supra note 6, at 157.
24. Buxton, supra note 3, at 49.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 158.
27. Id.
28. Howell, supra note 4, at 303 n.6 (citing MURRAY HUNT, USING HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN
THE ENGLISH COURTS (Oxford, 1998), Appendix 1.) In a study by Murray Hunt of 478
cases considered between 1964 and 1996 which made reference to the Convention, only 4
cases made reference to the First Protocol of the Convention which is concerned with
protecting "possessions," a concept that Howell feels clearly includes land (Howell, supra
note 4, at 287).
29. Pace, supra note 6, at 157.
30. Clayton, supra note 9, at 176.
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individual liberties."'3' In fact, "[a]mong signatories to the Convention, the United
Kingdom has compiled the second worst record before the European Court of
,,32Human Rights. This poor record indicated the need to better integrate human
rights into British law. 33  The Human Rights Act 1998 sought to bring that
integration into effect.
34
B. Property-Related Convention Rights
For cases involving land, there are four Articles that have been identified as the
basis for an alleged Convention violation - Article 1 of Protocol I, and Articles 6,
8 and 14 of the Convention; 35 with Articles 1, 6 and 8 having the most direct
36application. Article 1 of the Convention, although not adopted until two years
after the primary Convention, provides the broadest application to property law by
guaranteeing the "peaceful enjoyment of possessions." 37 While the term
"possessions" is not defined in the Convention, it arguably covers a wide variety of
"property" interests, including the rights inherent in the possession of freehold
estates and leases, easements, restrictive covenants, and options to buy or lease
38property. The Strasbourg Court has noted that this Article contains three distinct
but related elements: 1) the general principle of peaceful enjoyment of one's
possessions; 2) a general, but conditional, protection from deprivation of those
possessions; and 3) the limitation of the right by State determination that control of
possessions is necessary in the general (or "public") interest.39 Each of these
elements will have an impact on the application of the Convention to property law,
particularly in the areas of "Takings," as this concept is called in the American
Constitution. 40
31. LORD IRVINE, supra note 18, at 224.
32. Pace, supra note 6, at 159.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 152.
35. Howell, supra note 4, at 303, n.4.
36. SMITH, supra note 13, at 16.
37. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Protocol I, Article 1, March 20, 1952 [hereinafter Convention, Art.
I] ("Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one
shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions
provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions
shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure
payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.").
38. Howell, supra note 4, at 292-93.
39. Harpum, supra note 16, at 29.
40. U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 5.
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The next major Article of the Convention with application to property law is
Article 6 of the original Convention, which provides that, in the determination of
civil rights, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing before an independent
and impartial tribunal. 41 The Article mainly discusses this right in the context of
criminal charges. However, Article 6 is most appropriately referred to as a "right
to a fair hearing" since the scope of Article 6 extends, per the first clause, to civil
and administrative matters and is not limited to criminal trials alone.42 The
equivalent concept in American Constitutional law is "Due Process," the right to
notice and a fair hearing before any deprivation of any right.43 Article 6 of the
Convention is usually used in conjunction with other Convention rights when
dealing with property law cases.44 For example, in a survey of Strasbourg cases
heard in 1999, one of the three alleged violations of Article 1 was combined with
Article 6, and two of the Article 6 cases also involved Article I as a secondary
point of violation. 45 As Peter Halstead wrote, regarding the need for fair hearing:
[W]hen a person is deprived of property, such deprivation has to be effected
fairly and in a lawful manner, taking into consideration all relevant circumstances,
weighing the particular rights of the individual against the collective rights of the
community and achieving a fair balance between them, ensuring that payment of
compensation is made (if appropriate) and that the whole process is undertaken and
completed without unreasonable delay.46
Numerous property law cases are brought under a human rights laches
principle,47 due to the failure of the state to provide a timely, and thus fair, hearing
under Article 6.48 Italian cases seem to be a particularly common source of Article
6 property claims, arising from lack of timely police assistance in enforcing a
41. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Art. 6 [hereinafter Convention, Art. 6] (The first line of Article 6
reads: "in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.").
42. Peter Halstead, Human Property Rights, 2002 CONV. & Prop. Law. 153, 164 n.7 (Mar/Apr
2002).
43. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPAL AND POLICIES 523 (2nd ed.
2002).
44. Halstead, supra note 42, at 158.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 159.
47. Laches is an equitable doctrine in which the court denies relief to an applicant who has
unreasonably delayed asserting a claim in such a way as to prejudice the party against
whom relief is sought. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 879 (7th ed. 1999).
48. Halstead, supra note 42, at 159.
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possession order; but other countries have also been subject to Article 6 claims.49
The third Convention right with particular application to property law is Article
8 which protects the individual's right to one's home. 50 This Article grants a more
specific, but therefore more limited, right than the general right of Article 1 in
regards to the peaceful enjoyment to one's possessions. 51 The Strasbourg court has
held in various cases that Article 8 applies to a wide variety of potential
interferences with one's peaceful enjoyment of their home.52 The Strasbourg court
has interpreted Article 8 to not only require the state to refrain from such
interferences directly, but also to impose on the state a positive obligation to
prevent others from such impositions.53 This potentially broader protection of
one's right to his or her home is illustrated by a case involving eviction of a long-
term tenant due to failure to pay a minor service charge. 4 The court found that it
had no jurisdiction under Article 1 because the eviction was the result of a private
contract between the landlord and tenant. However, the court left open the
question as to whether there might be a violation of Article 8, commenting that
there might be a positive obligation for the state to prevent a disproportional
interference with the tenant's home.
55
The final Convention right commonly raised in property cases is Article 14.56
Article 14 involves discrimination. 57  By its plain terms, Article 14 is always
coupled with another Convention right since it only protects individuals from
49. Id. at 172 (citing Guglielmina Tieghi v. Italy E.Ct.H.R. (C L Rozakis P) 5/4/2001,
Document No. G0001232 (2001)).
50. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Art. 8 [hereinafter Convention, Art. 8] (Article 8, CI.1 reads:
"Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.").
51. Howell, supra note 4, at 296.
52. ROOK, supra note 19. (See generally Chapter entitled Article 8, which noted that
Strasbourg Court decisions have extended protection under Article 8 to: 1) a right of access
to the home; 2) a right of occupation of the home; 3) a right not to be evicted, and 4)
protection against intrusion into the home by the state in order to arrest, search, seize, or
inspect.)
53. Id.
54. Harpum, supra note 16, at 30 (citing Di Palma v. United Kingdom, reported as App. No.
11949/86, (1988) 10 E.H.R.R. 149).
55. Id.
56. Howell, supra note 4, at 303 n.4.
57. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Art. 14 [hereinafter Convention, Art. 14] ("The enjoyment of the
rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on
any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.")
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discrimination in regards to the "enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in
this Convention. 58  In this sense, Convention Article 14 is similar to the
Fourteenth Amendment of the American Constitution which protects persons from
denial of the "equal protection of the laws, 59 which will be discussed later in this
Comment.
C. Does the Convention Apply to Private Disputes
British commentators and courts generally agree that the Convention in itself is
only applicable to actions by the state and does not extend, at all, to actions
between two private parties. 60 There is limited application because the Convention
is a treaty, binding only the signatory governments, thereby only allowing the
Convention rights to be asserted by an individual against his or her national
government.
61
Commentators observed that in pre-HRA Convention rights cases, with only a
few hints at exceptions, the Convention rights were applied only to actions of the
state against an individual, and not to claims between private individuals. 62 The
Strasbourg cases show that even where a loss of possessions or interference with
one's home resulted from legal action by the state in the form of a court action,
Strasbourg would not find a violation of a Convention right if the root of the case
is a private contract and the court's only role was as an intermediary enforcing that
private agreement.63 Secondly, even with respect to applications of Convention
rights to direct state action against an individual, the Strasbourg court grants
significant discretion to the state by balancing the general interests of the
community against the impact on an individual's rights.64 Even the compulsory
transfer of property from one individual to another under state law, without
compensation, has been held to not violate Convention rights where a public
benefit from the transfer is recognized.65 And, finally, the Strasbourg court will
allow a great deal of loss of property value to result from state control of the use of
property, as contrasted to outright acquisition of the property, even where there is
58. Harpum, supra note 16, at 34.
59. U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1, Cl. 4.
60. Howell, supra note 4, at 288.
61. Buxton, supra note 3, at 49 (emphasis added).
62. Harpum, supra note 16, at 29.
63. Id. at 30.
64. Howell, supra note 4, at 290.
65. Id. at 294 (citing James v. United Kingdom, 8 E.H.R.R. 123 (1986)).
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little or no compensation for the lOSS.
66
Whether the HRA similarly applies Convention rights only to governmental
acts, or whether it will extend those rights to disputes between individuals, has
been hotly debated among British commentators.67 As will be discussed later in
Section III C, the experience in the United States with application of the Bill of
Rights to private disputes through the doctrine of "state action," may provide an
insight to this controversy in English law.
D. Does the HRA make Convention Rights More Applicable to Private Disputes
- the Vertical and Horizontal Effect
Prior to the adoption of the Human Rights Act 1998, the Convention was not
part of Great Britain's domestic law 68 and did not give rise to enforceable rights in
British courts.69 While the Convention did create rights that an individual could
exercise against his or her state government,70 the individual could only exercise
them by means of a cumbersome process of exhausting all domestic court avenues
of relief before petitioning for relief in Strasbourg.7' In a White Paper by the
British government 72 prior to adoption of the HRA, it was stated that one of the
main purposes of the Act was simply to "bring the Convention home," in other
words to lift the Convention rights out of the Strasbourg context and make them
enforceable in domestic law.73 The HRA would thus provide an easier, or at least
more convenient, route for British plaintiffs to claim their rights.74 When the Act
came into effect in October 2000, British courts could begin to directly apply
Convention rights.75 In fact, the HRA requires public authorities, including the
courts, to implement primary and secondary legislation "in a way which is
compatible with Convention rights. 76
66. Harpum, supra note 16, at 33.
67. See Wade, supra note 10 and Bamforth, supra note 12; But see Buxton, supra note 3.
68. Pace, supra note 6, at 161.
69. Buxton, supra note 3, at 49.
70. Id.
71. Pace, supra note 6, at 161.
72. United Kingdom Parliament, Making New Law, available at http://www.parliament.
uk/works/newlaw.cfm (last visited Jan. 28. 2006). White Papers are formal documents
prepared by the English government to explain or advocate for proposed legislation.
73. Buxton, supra note 3, at 49-50.
74. ROOK, supra note 19, at 20.
75. Buxton, supra note 3, at 49.
76. Human Rights Act 1998, 1998 Chapter 42 Sec. 3, Cl. (1) ("So far as it is possible to do so,
primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way
which is compatible with the Convention Rights.")
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Further, it is clear from the wording of Sections 6 and 8 of the Act, that the
HRA applies to actions of government officials and agencies and compels them to
act compatibly with the Convention.77 Some commentators felt that simplifying
the process of raising human rights issues was basically all that the HRA did,
arguing that such a "high level of conformity... already exist[ed] between the
requirements of the Convention and the principles of the common law" so that
reference to interpretations of Convention rights would be rarely needed.78 Under
this expectation of the impact of the HRA, the only issue would be the degree to
which direct government actions (and, maybe, actions of entities performing a
public function7 9) interfered with an individual's Convention rights.8 ° Some minor
broadening of the impact of Convention rights could occur depending on the
breadth of definition given to "functions of a public nature" by the courts 8' but,
overall, the HRA's reach would be no greater than the Convention.
However, authoritative commentators have argued that the HRA will have a
much broader reach through direct application to disputes between private
parties.82 These commentators felt that bringing the Convention into British
domestic law would have a more significant impact because the HRA not only
"brings the Convention home" 83 but also is likely to change the way judges
approach legal disputes.84 Case law, after the HRA became effective, has indicated
this change in judicial approach has already occurred in public law cases. For
example, in R. v. A. (No. 2), the court held that a rape-shield law protecting rape
victims from exploration of past sexual history violated the right of fairness to the
defendant under Article 6.85 The argument is that, since the HRA requires the
court to act compatibly with the Convention in all of their actions, the court
similarly must evaluate the application of Convention rights even in purely private
77. Human Rights Act 1998, 1998 Chapter 42 Sec. 6, Cl. (1) ("It is unlawful for a public
authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right." (emphasis added)
1998 Chapter 42 Sec. 8, Cl. (1) reads: "In relation to any act (or proposed act) of a public
authority which the court finds is (or would be) unlawful, it may grant such relief or
remedy, or make such order, within its powers as it considers just and appropriate."
(emphasis added)).
78. Buxton, supra note 3, at 61.
79. Dawn Oliver, Functions of a Public Nature under the Human Rights Act, P.L. 329, 330
(2004).
80. Buxton, supra note 3, at 49.
81. Oliver, supra note 79, at 331.
82. See Wade, supra note 10; Bamforth, supra note 12; Oliver, supra note 79.
83. Buxton, supra note 3, at 50.
84. Howell, supra note 4, at 288.
85. A. v. R (No. 2), 2 W.L.R. 1546 (2001).
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86dispute cases.
This potential impact of Convention rights on British domestic law is not clear,
however, since within the terms of the HRA, the Convention is not directly
incorporated into British law and only obligates the courts to interpret and apply
the law in a manner compatible with Convention rights.87 This language might
provide an "out" for the British courts with respect to the Convention, since they
88are not "bound" by the Convention. However, courts could also consider the
requirement to act compatibly with the Convention as a broad mandate both to
protect individuals from abuses by the state and to prevent state processes, like
court enforcement actions, from being used by individuals to abuse the rights of
others.89 One basis for this consideration of the HRA as a broader mandate comes
from the opening text of the HRA itself, which describes the HRA as "an Act to
give further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European
Convention on Human Rights." 90  Thus, there may develop "a whole new
jurisprudence" based on truly incorporating the human rights of the Convention
into British domestic law. 91  This distinction between application of the
Convention to suits by a plaintiff against the government versus application of the
Convention when private parties seek government (e.g., court) intervention to
resolve their private disputes has been termed the "vertical" effect of the HRA, as
opposed to the "horizontal" effect. 92
Since the HRA became effective in late 2000, there has been time for only a few
reported appellate-level cases involving the HRA and property law. 9 3 Therefore,
the main source of evaluation regarding the impact of the HRA on British property
law has been from academics. 94 These commentators generally agree that the
HRA will have some impact on British property law, although there is
disagreement as to the type and the depth of that impact.95 With respect to the
vertical question, it is clear from Section 3 of the HRA that all public authorities in
Great Britain, except Parliament, are now bound by the Convention. 96 So the
86. Howell, supra note 4, at 287.
87. Clayton, supra note 9, at 178.
88. Id. (quoting Lord Hoffman in R. (Alconbury) v. Secretary of State for the Environment).
89. Howell, supra note 4, at 288.
90. Human Rights Act 1998, 1998 Chapter 42.
91. Howell, supra note 4, at 310.
92. Bamforth, supra note 12, at 34.
93. SMITH, supra note 13, at 17.
94. Clayton, supra note 9, at 194-95, n.42 (listing eighteen separate articles on the subject
published between 1998 and 2002).
95. Halstead, supra note 42, at 153.
96. Human Rights Act 1998, 1998 Chapter 42, Section 3, Cl. (3) ("In this section, 'public
572
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question is not whether acts of public authorities are covered by the Convention,
rather it is whether the application of Convention rights results in any significant
change in English land law. 9 7 However, even within this narrow scope of the
HRA, some commentators have noted early cases suggesting that private entities
providing public-like services are also covered by the Section 3 requirements. 98 It
is noted for future discussion that courts in the United States have developed the
doctrines of "entanglement" and "public function" to extend many of the rights
protected under the Constitution to actions of private entities. 99
Greater uncertainty applies to the impact of applying the HRA and Convention
rights to purely private disputes."°° "Amongst the less expected [challenges to
practitioners and the courts] have been suggestions ... that the H.R.A. will have a
significant effect not only on public law issues . . . . but also upon private law
relationships between one citizen and another."' ' There are two sections of the
HRA which commentators' 0 2 argue give this "horizontal" effect: Section 3 which
requires legislation to be "read and given effect in a way which is compatible with
the Convention rights;"' 1 3 and Section 6, which makes it unlawful for a court (as a
specific "public authority") to "act in a way which is incompatible with a
Convention right."' 4 Nicholas Bamforth argues that "Section 3 is clearly not
confined to 'vertical' cases," suggesting that courts are required by the Act to
apply Convention rights through 'statutory interpretation' in disputes between
private parties.i05 Additionally, William Wade argues that since Section 6 includes
"courts" in the definition of "public authorities," if a Convention right is at issue, a
court must decide the case involving either public or private defendants, in
accordance with that right. 0 6 In private party disputes, the horizontal application
of the HRA and the application of Convention rights raise questions concerning
both the extent of difference between English law and Convention rights and the
authority' includes (a) a court of tribunal, and (b) any person certain of whose functions are
functions of a public nature, but does not include any House of Parliament or a person
exercising functions in connection with proceedings in Parliament.").
97. Buxton, supra note 3, at 61.
98. See Oliver, supra note 79.
99. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 488.
100. SMITH, supra note 13, at 16.
101. Buxton, supra note 3, at 48.
102. See Bamforth, supra note 12 and Wade, supra note 10.
103. Human Rights Act 1998 Sec 3, supra note 76.
104. Human Rights Act 1998 Sec. 6, supra note 77.
105. Bamforth, supra note 12, at 37.
106. Wade, supra note 10, at 217-18.
573
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extent to which the HRA and Convention law apply at all. 107
Unfortunately, the case law development to date of the horizontal impact of the
Convention by means of the HRA has not been significant. 10 8 However, in a
variety of non-final-appeals court cases, the fact has been well established that
HRA Section 3 does require the British courts to interpret legislation in private
party disputes in a manner consistent with the Convention.'09
Article 8 of the Convention may also result in horizontal application of human
rights to individual disputes. The potential positive obligation of the state under
Article 8 to prevent private interference with one's home was strengthened by the
case of Arrondelle v. United Kingdom." The Strasbourg court held that although
noise was generated by private aircraft, the state was sufficiently tied to that
activity to allow enforcement of the Convention since the airport (Gatwick) was
operated by a public airport authority and the British government had assisted in
the airport's location and development."' It is interesting to note for future
discussion at Section IV A, the parallel to the U. S. Supreme Court case of Shelley
v. Kraemer,' 2 where state enforcement of a private agreement alone was sufficient
to trigger the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, thus prohibiting court
enforcement of a racially discriminatory private covenant.
The growing likelihood of horizontal application, and the certainty of vertical
application, suggests that the potential for the HRA to substantially affect property
law is significant.' 13  In the absence of a developed and applicable British
jurisprudence, it is particularly in the developing field of the application of the
HRA to private party disputes that the American experience may provide a useful
guide to the British legal system.
107. See Buxton, supra note 3, at 51.
108. Clayton, supra note 9, at 182.
109. Id. at 182-83 (citing, as examples, two cases, Wilson v. First County Trust and Wilson v.
First County Trust (No. 2) where Articles 1 and 6 of the Convention must be applied to the
particular legislative bar against enforcing a credit agreement, even though the litigants
were both private parties.)
110. Arrondelle v. United Kingdom, (1983) 5 E.H.R.R. 118.
111. Howell, supra note 4, at 291.
112. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
113. Howell, supra note 4, at 302.
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III. Background - Human Rights and Property Law
A. Sample Cases Applying Convention Rights to Property Law Issues
Although there are few British land-law cases that have been considered under
the Convention to date, property law issues related to Convention human rights
have been raised in cases from other European countries. Those decisions lay the
best foundation for consideration of the future impact of the HRA's "bringing
home" of the Convention on British land law.'" 4 To create a justiciable issue under
the Convention, there must first be an alleged violation of a designated right, a
victim," S and, second, all domestic remedies must be exhausted." 6  This is
equivalent to the requirements in America that there must be a case or
controversy' 17 and that all non-constitutional arguments must fail before arguing a
constitutional right.18 Once the hurdles of finding a Convention fight violation
and exhausting all domestic remedies have been overcome, the dispute may then
be considered on the merits of the human rights claim. The discussion of human
rights as applied to property law cases under the Convention, and later under the
Constitution, will focus on four issues - Regulatory Takings, Discrimination, Due
Process, and Adverse Possession - to generally examine how the American
experience may apply to the British development of law under the HRA.
Article l,"9 addressing Deprivation of Possessions, or Takings, has potentially
broad application to property law. 20  For example, "possessions" arguably
includes "property," but "possessions" also includes a wide variety of interests
including some, such as licenses, which might not be defined as "property" by the
individual country.12' Secondly, although there may be a deprivation of a
possession, thus triggering Article 1 in the first element,122 the deprivation in the
second element may not be a violation of Article 1 because the action is either "in
the public interest" or is "control" allowed by the third element of Article 1.123
114. Id. at 288.
115. Id. at 290.
116. Id. at 304 n.12 (citing Howard v. United Kingdom, 9 E.H.R.R. 116 (1987)).
117. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 49.
118. Id. at 52-53.
119. Convention, Art. 1, supra note 37.
120. Howell, supra note 4, at 293.
121. Id. at 293 (noting Benthem v. Netherlands, 6 E.H.R.R. 283 (1984) where a license was held
to be "proprietary" because it was assignable).
122. See supra text at 6-7.
123. Howell, supra note 4, at 294 (noting James v. United Kingdom, (1986) 8 E.H.R.R. 123
where the compulsory transfer of property under the Leasehold Reform Act 1967 was not
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Whether a given action is deprivation, is in the public interest, or is control and not
deprivation, is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the individual's right
to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. 24  For example, in Sporrong and
ldnnroth v. Sweden, 125 the Strasbourg court found that there had been a violation
of Article 1126 although there was neither a deprivation of the property in fact, nor
an intent to control its use or ownership. 127 The test that the Strasbourg court has
applied to distinguish "control" from "deprivation" was whether the state's action
has taken away all meaningful use of the land from the plaintiffs.
128
Another factor that had significant importance in pre-HRA Article 1 "takings"
cases is whether the state compensated the property owner. 129 In a case involving
compensation to shipbuilding companies that had been nationalized, the Court
noted that "the taking of property ... without payment of compensation is . . .
justifiable only in exceptional circumstances.', 30 However, the Strasbourg court
does not appear to require full value compensation for property taken by the state,
but rather considers compensation in determining whether a "fair balance had been
struck between the various [public and private] interests at stake.' ' 131  This
language is interesting in comparison to the United States Supreme Court cases on
regulatory takings, such as Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York,132 discussed below.
Article 6 of the Convention protects the right that is called Due Process133 in
American jurisprudence, that is, the right of everyone to a fair and public hearing
before an independent and impartial tribunal.134 In the five years since the HRA
became effective, there has been time for only a few cases to pass through the full
British trial and appeals process, and even within these relatively few cases, the
due process impact of the Convention is mixed. First, it is unclear to what extent
held to violate the Convention because the deprivation achieved a greater public purpose).
124. Harpum, supra note 16, at 31-32.
125. Sporrong and Lonnroth v. Sweden, (1983) 5 E.H.R.R. 35 (involving the Stockholm City
Council issuing expropriation permits but then not executing them for several years. This
action effectively froze the property, denying the owners a reasonable opportunity to sell or
use the land.).
126. Harpum, supra note 16, at 31.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 32.
129. Id. at33.
130. Id. (citing Lithgow v. United Kingdom, (1986) 8 E.H.R.R. 329.
131. Harpum, supra note 16, at 33.
132. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
133. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 557.
134. Convention, Art. 6, supra note 41.
576
British Property Law and Human Rights 577
the application of Convention rights will alter the decisions of British courts.
For example in the case of Leeds City Council v. Price,135 the Court of Appeal
held that they were bound to follow the precedent set by the House of Lords
decision in London Borough of Harrow v. aazi,136 even though the court
acknowledged that the Qazi decision appeared to conflict with a recent
interpretation of the Convention in Strasbourg 137 in Connors v. United Kingdom.
138
In Connors, the Strasbourg court held that requisite procedural safeguards must be
provided, including a statement of justification for the interference with a
Convention right, thus limiting the unqualified right of a public authority under
British domestic law to reclaim its land. 139 In Qazi, the House of Lords held that
the Convention rights could not operate to deprive the property rights of others as
defined by domestic law. 140 The Appeals Court in Price held that it was bound to
follow the interpretation of the Convention from the House of Lords rather than the
interpretation by the Strasbourg court. This decision would appear to be
unexpected given the text of the HRA, Section 2, which states a court must take
into account the decisions of the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.14 1 On
March 8, 2006, the House of Lords on appeal of the lower court's decision in Price
held that a public authority landlord's unqualified right of possession under
domestic law would automatically supply the justification under Article 8(2) of the
Convention for interference with an occupier's right to respect for his home
provided by Section 8(1), thus affirming the position taken in Qazi.142 At least one
commentator feels it is unlikely that the Strasbourg court would uphold the
decision in Price should it be appealed to them.
14 3
135. Leeds City Council v. Price, (2005) 1 W.L.R. 1825 (involving the question of whether
gypsies who had camped on land owned by the Leeds City Council could be evicted
without a hearing since they had no camping permit).
136. London Borough of Harrow v. Qazi, (2003) U.K.H.L. 43 (involving whether a husband
could be evicted from a public housing unit originally leased jointly to the husband and
wife if the wife, having left the husband, no longer lived there, resulting in the husband's
sole occupancy which violated the lease terms).
137. Planning and Gypsies, J.P.L. (2005, May) B9, B9.
138. Connors v. United Kingdom (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 9 (involving eviction of a gypsy from a
camping site run by the Leeds City Council after there were allegations of misbehavior).
139. Planning and Gypsies, supra note 137.
140. Qazi, U.K.H.L. 43 at para. 122.
141. Human Rights Act 1998, 1998 Chapter 42, Sec. 2, Cl. (1) ("A court of tribunal determining
a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right must take into account
any (a) judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European Court of
Human Rights....").
142. Leeds City Council v. Price, (2006) U.K.H.L. 10 (summary available at http://www.
lawreports.co.uk/WLRD/2006/HLPC/marO.7.htm).
143. Planning and Gypsies, supra note 137, at B10.
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In perhaps the most significant HRA case to be decided to date is R.
(Alconbury) v. Secretary of State for the Environment,14 the House of Lords again
tended to diminish the impact of the Convention on British law.145 This case
involved a "planning permission" (a type of development approval) that was
"called in" (taken over by) the Secretary of State, preventing a potentially negative
local vote on a major redevelopment of a closed military airfield. 146 Residents of
the area appealed the Secretary's action under the Convention on the grounds of
Article 6, which requires a fair hearing before an independent tribunal.1 47 The
residents claimed that since the Secretary was a government official and since the
government would benefit from the redevelopment, the Secretary could not be an
"independent tribunal. ' 148  The House of Lords found no conflict with the
Convention, although this due process case is being appealed to Strasbourg.
149
This case is interesting because not only is there the issue of whether the Secretary
of State for the Environment can be an impartial tribunal in these circumstances,
but also because the House of Lords itself may not be an impartial tribunal to
render decisions involving alleged "public authority" violations of Convention
rights. After all, the House of Lords is not only a part of the government that is
benefiting from the development, but it is also a part of the legislature that adopted
the planning permission that allegedly would interfere with the residents' peaceful
enjoyment of their property.
Article 8 of the Convention,' 50 and Article 1,151 apply to cases of Adverse
Possession. Although specifically based on Convention Article I and a claim of
violation of the claimant's right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions, 52 the
legal reasoning of Beaulane Properties LTD v. Palmer153 equally applies to
challenges raised under Article 8. In this case, Palmer had been given permission
to graze horses on a certain property, then took further action to fence that property
and appeared to use it exclusively for twelve years, the statutory minimum for
adverse possession rights.154 When the true owner sought to evict Palmer, Palmer
144. R. (Alconbury) v. Secretary of State for the Environment, (2003) 2 A.C. 295.
145. Clayton, supra note 9, at 191.
146. Alconbury, 2 A.C. 295, 295.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Clayton, supra note 9, at 191.
150. Convention, Art. 8, supra note 50.
151. Convention, Art. 1, supra note 37.
152. Beaulane Properties LTD v. Palmer, (2005) 3 W.L.R. 554, 555.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 562.
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raised not only the claim of adverse possession, but also a claim under the HRA
and Convention Section 1, Protocol I to the right of peaceful enjoyment of his
possession' 55 (the claimed land) against the counterclaim of the true owner. 156 The
court acknowledged that it was bound by the HRA to interpret the statutes
governing adverse possession and "registration" (Great Britain's property
ownership recording system) in a manner consistent with the Convention, 5 7 but
held that the applicable statutes could best be interpreted with respect to the
Convention by finding that Palmer had not met the test of exclusive possession that
was adverse to the claim of the true owner. 158 The court thus affirmed the
application of the HRA to private disputes, and sidestepped the question of
violation of a Convention right by interpreting the internal meaning of the
applicable statutes against the specific facts of the case.
An example of the coupling of Article 14's protection against Discrimination1
59
with other rights protected by the Convention is the case of Chassagnou v.
France. In this case, the Strasbourg court found that there had been a
deprivation of property in violation of Article 1 under a French law that required
small property owners to transfer hunting rights on their land to hunting
associations, granting them, in compensation, the right to hunt on all lands
controlled by that association.' 6 ' The deprivation of hunting rights was found to be
a discriminatory violation of Article 14 because the compensation provided was of
value only to small land owners who were hunters, thereby discriminating against
non-hunting landowners who would derive no value from being granted
association hunting rights. 162 While the court took the "unusual"' 163 step here of
finding the deprivation was discriminatory, the reasoning of the court in general
suggests that the social aim sought to be achieved will be given great weight by the
court when determining the proportionality between the legislative restriction's
means and ends.' 64
Additionally, other cases indicate that, with respect to some social aims, like
155. Convention, Art. 1, supra note 37.
156. Beaulane, 3 W.L.R. at 559.
157. Id. at 555, para. 2.
158. Id. at 555, para. 3.
159. Convention, Art. 14, supra note 57.
160. Chassagnou v. France, Application No. 25088/94, (1999) 29 E.H.R.R. 615.
161. Id.
162. Id. at T 89, 95.
163. Harpurn, supra note 16, at 34.
164. Id.
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housing, the court will give the state wide latitude, a "margin of appreciation. '' 65
In an Italian case referencing the Chassagnou decision, the Strasbourg court
observed it would "respect the legislature's judgment as to what is in the general
interest unless that judgment is manifestly without reasonable foundation."' 166 "By
implication, in matters less central to a state's welfare and economic policies, the
Court (sic) will be much less ready to defer to the state...,,167
Although these decisions indicate minimal impact on the actual outcome of
decisions due to application of the HRA and the Convention, commentators have
found that the Human Rights Act "has significantly influenced the style and
content of decision-making."' 6 8 The question addressed by this Comment is
whether the American experience with the Bill of Rights and property law might
inform this "style and content of decision-making" and may indicate that
application of the Convention will affect the outcome of future litigation.
B. Conceptual Comparison of American Constitutional Rights to Convention
Rights Under the HRA
Before looking at examples of application of American constitutional rights to
property law issues, it is necessary to establish that such applications would
meaningfully relate to the HRA's application of similar rights in Great Britain.
Great Britain does not have a constitution that codifies fundamental rights. It has
instead relied on precedent, customs and Acts of Parliament to collectively
safeguard basic rights. 169 However, Parliament, by simple majority vote, has had
the power to repeal any such rights established by prior legislation. 70  The
judiciary has not been able to protect fundamental rights because the British courts
lacked the power of judicial review based on an established code of rights as
American courts do.
17 1
The HRA has, at least partially, changed this. Commentators argue that the
HRA is a constitutional instrument in at least three ways. 72 First, the HRA bases
application of human rights to individual cases by reference to a specific body of
165. Id.
166. Id. at 35.
167. Id.
168. Clayton, supra note 9, at 176.
169. Pace, supra note 6, at 151.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Clayton, supra note 9, at 194.
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principles that are independent of the current legislature. 173 Second, the HRA
provides an independent framework for interpretation of other legislation.
174
Third, the substantive values embodied in the Act provide it with a distinctively
constitutional status. 175 This status is important because a set of rights will not be
sufficiently protected from governmental encroachment if it is "only given the
status of ordinary domestic legislation."' 176 However, the HRA is not a fully
entrenched set of rights; it does not fully give British judges the authority to
overturn an act of Parliament. The most the courts can do is to declare that specific
legislation at issue is incompatible with the Convention. 177 However, by at least
partially "entrenching" the human rights of the Convention into domestic law,
Great Britain's judges often will be able to interpret government actions to
minimize the frustration of these rights, giving them powers similar to American-
style judicial review. 178
The impact of the HRA's incorporation of a written body of human rights on
British law in many ways appears to echo the early formation of American, as
distinguished from Colonial, law. In his Millennium Lecture to the Inner Temple,
the Lord Irvine noted the strong linkage between British and American law, based
on a shared heritage of historical common law. 17 9 However, following American
Independence, the American legal system rejected the British legal system's sole
reliance on common law precedence and the democratic law-making process of
Parliament' 80 and replaced it with the Constitution's "core of basic rights that
trump common law or statutory intervention.",181 This difference can be summed
up as an American reliance on entrenched statements of basic rights as the safest
defense of liberty in contrast to the British reliance on liberty protected by the
processes of a democratic legislature.'
82
To protect liberty, British law has relied on two principles: the principle of
precedence and common law as the basis of legal judgments concerning rights, 183
and the principle of the sovereign Parliament establishing those rights. 184 The first
173. Id. at 194-95.
174. Id. at 195.
175. Id.
176. Pace, supra note 6, at 160.
177. Human Rights Act 1998, 1998 Chapter 42, Section 4, CI. (1).
178. Pace, supra note 6, at 160.
179. LORD IRVINE, supra note 18, at 210-11.
180. Id. at211-12.
181. Id. at 214.
182. Id. at 212.
183. Id. at214.
184. Id. at 220.
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principle resulted in a right, being once applied to a legal situation, continuing to
be applied to the same, or similar, legal situations.' 85 The second principle
reflected a philosophy that a democratically elected Parliament would be a better
protector of rights than a non-elected judiciary interpreting a written, and
unchanging, set of statements of rights. 186  The American legal system has
substantially the retained the former, but limits the latter with the "veto power" of
the rights embedded in the Constitution, as interpreted and applied by the courts.
Proponents of embodying fundamental rights as part of written British law seek
to establish in Great Britain "the institutional and procedural protections that the
United States accords in its Bill of Rights."'187 "[T]he Human Rights Act will do
much to reduce the gap between England and America... [by] provid[ing] a clear
statement of fundamental rights with sufficient democratic credentials to be
directly upheld by an English court."1 88 Because of this similarity between the
position of Convention rights in Britain after adoption of the HRA and the position
of American constitutional rights, it is reasonable to expect that the American
experience with application of such rights to property law may serve as a model for
Great Britain. As Lord Irvine concluded:
The Human Rights Act provides a fine example of the ways in which English
law can benefit from American experience . . . . We have come to accept that
American experience shows that a written declaration provides a more certain
safeguard of individual rights than procedural democracy through a sovereign
Parliament .... 189
C. Examples of Impact of American Constitutional Rights on American Property
Law
The lessons to be learned from protection of human rights through application
of the American Constitution are both positive and negative. For example,
numerous instances of protecting and advancing such rights can be found in the
decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts, 90 but numerous examples can also be
found where the Supreme Court defeated legislative efforts to extend human rights
by freeing the slave, guaranteeing civil rights to minorities, or protecting
185. LORD IRVINE, supra note 18, at 210.
186. Id. at 220.
187. Pace, supra note 6, at 152.
188. LORD IRVINE, supra note 18, at 224.
189. Id. at 225.
190. Pace, supra note 6, at 180.
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economically hard-pressed farmers.' 9I Nonetheless, property law in the United
States has been deeply impacted by the application of constitutional rights by the
American courts over the past eighty years (since the Supreme Court upheld
zoning as a constitutional exercise of a state's police power),19 and especially over
the past fifty years (since the Court held that involvement of the government in
enforcing property rights could trigger constitutional protections, even between
private parties). 193
To begin with, an examination of the American application of human rights to
private party actions through the doctrine of "state action"'194 can inform the British
debate concerning the vertical and horizontal application of the HRA. Inherently,
the Constitution's protection of human rights only applies to the government since,
similar to the Convention, the Constitution is a compact between different
governments. 95  However, in Shelley v. Kraemer,'96 in a dispute between two
parties over a racially restrictive covenant, the Supreme Court held that since one
property owner was seeking to use the court to enforce a discriminatory covenant
against another, there was sufficient state action to require consideration of the
constitutional rights of the disadvantaged party.' 97 It is clear, however, something
more than passive action, such as the running of a statutory time limit for bringing
a lawsuit, is needed; overt, significant assistance of the state in enforcing a private
party claim is needed to trigger constitutional rights.
198
American jurisprudence also has developed the concept of state action through
the doctrines of "public function ' 99 and "entanglement., 200 These two doctrines
operate to extend the application of the U.S. Constitution, which otherwise would
191. Id.
192. Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
193. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
194. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 469.
195. Id. at 480, 486 (In the Convention, the compact is between different nations, while in the
Constitution, it is compact between the national and state governments.).
196. Shelley, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
197. Id. at 20 ("State action, as that phrase is understood for the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment, refers to exertions of state power in all forms. And when the effect of that action is
to deny rights subject to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is the obligation of this
Court to enforce the constitutional commands.").
198. Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486 (1988).
199. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 478 ("[T]he 'public function exception,' [ ] says that a
private entity must comply with the Constitution if it is performing a task that has been
traditionally, exclusively done by the government.").
200. Id. at 487 ("[T]he 'entanglement exception,' [ ] says that private conduct must comply with
the Constitution if the government has authorized, encouraged, or facilitated the
unconstitutional conduct.").
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apply only to actions of governments, and not to private parties. An interesting
extension of the state action doctrine is found in N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama.2"' This
case involved a court order requested by the State of Alabama that the N.A.A.C.P.
release their full membership list, which likely would have put such members at
risk of harm.2 °2 This case is remarkable in two ways. First, the Court held that
governmental action may be struck down, even if the action is totally unrelated to a
protected liberty right, if the indirect consequence of that action would interfere
with a protected right.2 °3 Secondly, state action itself does not need to interfere
with an individual's rights if the action would result in private, third party, action
that would interfere with protected rights. 204 These cases and doctrines appear to
be directly applicable to the debate over whether the HRA. By requiring public
205 206authorities, including the courts, to act compatibly with the Convention, the
HRA requires an English court to extend Convention rights to private disputes.
With respect to the four exemplar issues (Regulatory Takings, Due Process,
Adverse Possession, and Discrimination), American Supreme Court jurisprudence,
over the past fifty years in particular, has spoken directly to the equivalent issues in
Great Britain. With regard to Regulatory Takings, the Supreme Court has a long
history of cases on point.20 7  It should be noted that "takings" is much more
directly an issue in American property law than in British law. The Framers of the
United States Constitution felt private property was so important to individual
liberty that the Fifth Amendment explicitly protects it from governmental
deprivation. 2° 8  In contrast, British land law is not primarily concerned with
ownership, rather it is concerned with possession and use. 20 9 As a result, the nature
of ownership is rarely litigated in Great Britain, but the extent of rights of
possession and use of the land by individuals is frequently litigated. 210 The lack of
litigation over government taking of possession of private land is so profound that
one of the leading British texts on property law has no chapter on the subject at
201. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
202. Id. at 462.
203. Id. at 461.
204. Id. at 463.
205. Human Rights Act 1998, 1998 Chapter 42, Section 6, Cl. (3)(a).
206. Id., Cl. (1).
207. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (which carefully distinguished
regulation under the police power from a taking, even when that regulation (banning
manufacture of bricks at a clay quarry) eliminated ninety-five percent of the property's
value).
208. U.S. Const. amend. V.
209. SMITH, supra note 13, at 6.
210. Id.
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all.21' However, the issue of taking one's possessions, including land, is raised
directly by the HRA because it brings Convention Article 1, Protocol I into British
law, explicitly protecting one's possessions from government deprivation.
2 12
A leading Supreme Court case on Regulatory Takings is Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon,213 in which the United States Supreme Court introduced the concept of
proportionality. The Supreme Court held that the state legislation that prohibited
mining that would cause surface subsidence went "too far' 214 and, therefore, was a
constitutionally prohibited taking, even though the state had not taken title to the
215mine. This use of a proportionality test was further amplified in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City. 2 6 In Penn Central, a case involving a
regulation limiting redevelopment of a designated historical structure, the Supreme
Court held that that, while a regulation that goes too far would be a taking,
determining what is "too far" must be determined by balancing the severity of the
impact of the regulation against the promotion of the general welfare. 217 It is noted
that Penn Central also provides an informative summary of the evolution of the
concept of regulatory takings for the half century between Hadacheck and Penn
Central.
218
Regulatory takings jurisprudence has continued to evolve in America. In Lucas
v. So. Carolina Coastal Council,219 the Supreme Court held that a regulation that
denies the property owner all economic use of his land is a taking for which
compensation must be paid. However, the amount of compensation, and even if
the regulation is in fact a taking at all, entails a balancing of what uses would be
otherwise allowed under common-law. 220 Thus, all construction on the property
might be able to be denied through regulation (as was done here) without it
constituting a taking if such construction would otherwise be prohibited, for
211. Id. at v - xiii "Contents."
212. Convention, Art. 1, supra note 37.
213. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922) ("[t]he general rule at least
is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking.").
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
217. Id. at 136.
218. See id. at 123-28.
219. Lucas v. So. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (involving a prohibition of
construction of a house in a sensitive beach area that, according to the trial court, reduced
the property's value to zero).
220. Id. at 1022-23.
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example, as public or private nuisance. 22 1 But on the other hand, any regulation
that is clearly to obtain a public benefit (as opposed to avoidance of a public
detriment), even a regulation that has relatively minor impact on the value of the
property, will trigger a takings claim for compensation, as held in Nollan v.
222California Coastal Commission. That case involved a condition on a building
permission for a house on beachfront property that the property owner had to grant
an easement along the beachfront for public access, since, arguably, the house
would impede public access from a public road across the property to the ocean.223
The Supreme Court held that there was not a sufficient connection, or "nexus,"
between the possible impediment of road-to-beach access and the Coastal
Commission's requirement for lateral access along the beach.2 2 4 Without this
connection, the Supreme Court held that the condition was merely requiring the
Nollans to contribute to the arguably good idea of a continuous publicly accessible
beach.225 The balance required by Penn Central was not present because the
regulation did not relate to the imputed impact of the development. Therefore, if
the Commission wanted the easement, they would have to pay for it.
2 26
Using this same principle of proportionality, the Supreme Court held in Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency that a temporary
(two and a half year long) deprivation of property use is not a takings for which
compensation must be paid, provided that temporary deprivation is necessary to
achieve a significant public benefit. 227 The Supreme Court has also determined
that land that is acquired by the government from one private owner can be
transferred for use by another private owner, as long as the transfer serves a
228significant public purpose.
Regarding the second topic of Due Process, the main issue in Great Britain
appears to concern a litigant's right to a fair and impartial tribunal. This issue is of
particular, and somewhat unique, concern in Britain due to the structure of its
government and the lack of separation between the judicial system and the
221. Id. at 1030-31.
222. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
223. Id. at 828.
224. Id. at 841.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 842.
227. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002).
228. See Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Kelo v. City of New
London, 126 S.Ct. 24 (2005).
British Property Law and Human Rights 587
legislative system. 229  In American law, most of the development of the law
concerning fair and impartial hearings has been in the field of administrative law.
For example, in Tumey v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that a defendant is
deprived of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment if the adjudicator has a
"personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in the outcome.,, 230 Even the appearance
of bias or prejudgment has been ruled to be sufficient to disqualify a decision-
maker from participating in an adjudication of rights.231 Cases involving the direct
issue of overlap between judiciary and other branches of government are rare in the
United States due to its structure of government with its constitutional separation
of powers, 232 but there are some cases on point where an administrative agency is
in the position of adjudicating specific rights. In these circumstances, it is settled
law that "[when] an agency performs a quasi-judicial ... function its independence
must be protected.,
233
American law regarding Adverse Possession still retains close ties to its British
roots.234 Whether adverse possession is in conflict with the constitutional
protection against takings has been addressed directly by the American Supreme
Court in several cases. 235 The American legal response has been that property
interests are not created by the Constitution, but are defined by state law.236 Since
"property" is a legal construct, a bundle of rights defined by statute, states are free
237to establish the parameters of those rights. In the case of adverse possession,
one of the state-defined attributes of property is a time dimension; one's interest in
land may be defined by the state to exist for as long as he pursues that interest to
the exclusion of others over a specified period of time.238
229. LORD IRVINE OF LAIRG, BRITAIN'S PROGRAMME OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, reprinted
in HUMAN RIGHTS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENGLISH
LEGAL SYSTEM 93-4 (2003) (Text from speech originally given to the Canadian Institute of
Advanced Legal Studies, Queen's College, Cambridge, July 16, 1999.).
230. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
231. Cinderella Career and Finishing Schools, Inc. v. F.T.C., 425 F.2d 583, 138 U.S. App. D.C.
152 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
232. See generally U.S. Const. art. I, II and III (establishing the Legislative, Executive and
Judicial Branches of the federal government).
233. Portland Audubon Soc. v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1546 (9th Cir.
1993).
234. JESSE DUKEMINIER AND JAMES KRIER, PROPERTY, 126 (Aspen Publishers, 5th ed. 2002).
235. See generally Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 531 (1982) for general description of the
relationship of the doctrine of adverse possession and the Constitution.
236. Id. at 525.
237. DUKEMINIER AND KRIER, supra note 234, at 93.
238. Texaco, 454 U.S. at 526 ("From an early time, this Court has recognized that States have the
power to permit unused or abandoned interests in property to revert to another after the passage
of time.").
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Finally, over the past fifty years, the Supreme Court has developed an extensive
jurisprudence regarding Discrimination and property law, although one may argue
whether there is a clear progression to this jurisprudence. For example, in United
States v. Stanley, the Supreme Court explicitly held that the protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment 239 only applied to state legislation and not to any private
acts, under any conditions. 240 The Supreme Court did not even consider whether
anything other than overt discrimination by state legislation was covered by the
Constitution for over sixty years. Finally, with Shelley v. Kraemer, the Supreme
Court established the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment could be used to
apply Constitutional rights to private disputes, if the private parties entangled the
court in enforcing an agreement that violated those rights. 241 But there must be
some specific involvement of the state in the discrimination (or the enforcement of
242discriminatory private activities) to trigger the constitutional protection.
The Supreme Court has held that prohibited discrimination is not limited to
race, holding in various cases that equal protection under Fourteenth Amendment
also applies to national origin, gender, marital status of one's parents, age,
disability, wealth, and sexual orientation.243 Basically, the American constitutional
protections against discrimination will be triggered when any legislation or court
decision applies a different legal treatment to one group versus another; for most of
the classifications noted above, the legislation or court decision will be sustained
only if the distinction is necessary to achieve a substantial public purpose.
244
Further, it is clear from American jurisprudence that such protection is not a right
in and of itself, but only in relationship to otherwise legitimately established
rights.245 This also appears to be the case with the Convention right against
246discrimination. While this quick summary of American jurisprudence on
239. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1, Cl 2 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
240. United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 25-26 (1883).
241. Shelley, 334 U.S. 1, 20.
242. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625 (2000) (involving sexual harassment of a
women by a member of a college football team. After the Court found that federal
legislation, the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, was not within the powers of
Congress to adopt, the Court held that since there was no state action involved, the
constitutional protections against discrimination were not triggered by a purely private act
of one individual against another).
243. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 649.
244. Id. at 646.
245. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
246. Convention, Art. 14, supra note 57.
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discrimination indicates more of a process of consideration than a final conclusion
as to who is protected against discrimination and when, the point of this Comment
is that the human rights issues raised by the application of the Convention to
British law under the HRA have been extensively explored in American law.
IV. American Experience as Guidance for Interfrating the HRA
and Brittish Property Law
A. Introduction - Have Convention Rights been Consistently Applied to British
Property Issues
Many British commentators hold that adoption of Convention rights will have
little impact because British law is already largely consistent with these rights.
247
But "largely" does not mean "perfectly." The degree of conflict will depend on the
court's interpretation of the HRA and the Convention, as well as existing British
law. "It is a truism to say that everyone is likely to be affected sooner or later by
the ramifications of the incorporation of the Convention . . .into English law by
the Human Rights Act 1998., 24' The HRA requires the courts, and other public
officials, to interpret existing law to be consistent with the Convention to the extent
reasonably possible.249
Because the application of the Convention under the HRA to British law is still
new, inconsistent interpretations are readily found. For example, in R. (Alconbury)
v. Secretary of State,25 ° the House of Lords declared its dual functions of
legislature and judiciary to be consistent with the Convention. But in McGonnell
v. United Kingdom (2000),251 the Strasbourg Court held that "independent"
required even more than actual independence of the tribunal, it also required the
appearance of independence.252 The Strasbourg Court held that the membership
of the decision making body must be limited to parties who have not had a role in
creating the disputed legislation,253 which appears to directly conflict with the
holding in Alconbury. Such conflicts in interpretation illustrate that during the
integration of the body of Convention rights into British law there will be
247. See, e.g., Buxton, supra note 3, at 61; Bamforth, supra note 12, at 41; or Howell, supra note
4, at 310.
248. Halstead, supra note 42, at 153.
249. Human Rights Act 1998, Sec. 3, supra note 76.
250. See R. (Alconbury) v. Secretary of State for the Environment, 2 A.C. 295 (2003).
251. McGonnell v. United Kingdom, 30 E.H.R.R. 289 (2000).
252. Id. at 300.
253. Id.
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uncertainties and differences for which Great Britain's judiciary, lacking a strong
grounding in judicial interpretation of legislation against an independent body of
rights, is ill equipped to handle. 54
The experience of other legal systems which have faced this same task will
arguably assist this transition. And the legal system that is closest to Britain's, and
which has faced precisely the same challenge of applying a body of fundamental
human rights to day-to-day adjudication, is the legal system of the United States.255
It should be acknowledged that comparison will not be precise since the two
governmental systems are not completely parallel. The U.S. Constitution is more
definitive than the Convention (for example, constitutionally requiring
compensation for a taking),256 in contrast to the judicial consideration of
compensation as a measure of proportionality under the Convention.257 Further,
the comparison will not be precise because of the differences between American
property ownership law and British right-of-use property law. However, two
major similarities can be drawn. Both systems, America under its Constitution and
Great Britain under the HRA, have a written set of "superior" rights that bind
governmental actions. Secondly, after the HRA, both systems have a defined,
independent set of rights as their foundation, as compared to the pre-HRA British
situation where human rights were, at least theoretically, as changeable as the
government might chose.25 s
British commentators must take care in searching for lessons from United States
property and constitutional law jurisprudence because this body of law stems
mainly from judicial interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. By strict wording,
only a few Constitutional rights have direct application to property law in the
U.S.25 9 For example, an British lawyer researching the question of American
Constitutional rights applied to private party disputes might conclude that there is
no such constitutional language, unless the lawyer read the United States Supreme
Court opinion in Shelley v. Kramer holding that Constitutional rights apply to
254. Pace, supra note 6, at 186.
255. LORD IRVINE, supra note 18, at 225.
256. U.S. Const. amend. V, Cl. 4.
257. Harpum, supra note 16, at 31.
258. Pace, supra note 6, at 151.
259. These few rights include: the guarantee of freedom to contract, which includes contracts in
land (Art. I, Section 10, CI.1); the right not to have troops quartered in one's home without
consent (Amend. 1II); the right to compensation when property is taken for a public purpose
(Amend. V); the right to due process, defined as the opportunity to be notified and be heard,
in any government action affecting an individual's land or property rights (Amend. V &
XIV); and protection against discrimination, including discrimination in the exercise of
property rights (Amend. XIV).
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private parties whenever they seek to entangle the government (a court or other
agency) in enforcement of a private obligation. 260 But with appropriate study, the
British lawyer will see, as in this example, that the question of horizontal
application of human rights has indeed been addressed in the United States and
may offer informative comparisons as Great Britain comes to grips with the
Convention. Indeed, British lawyers will recognize the logic of Shelley, having
experienced this same reasoning in the decision by the Strasbourg court in
Arrondelle v. United Kingdom where it was used to apply Convention rights to a
private party dispute over aircraft noise.
261
B. Takings
There are several important parallels between the protection of possessions
under the Convention and protection of property under the Fifth Amendment.
Both begin with the protection of the property, and both then limit that protection
by allowing a deprivation in the public interest. 262 Further, both separate taking
possession from controlling the use of those possessions. 263 To be sure, there are
distinguishing elements between American and Convention law on this issue. For
example, American law simply requires that property cannot be taken for a public
264use without compensation, as contrasted to the Convention where compensation
is not mentioned, but may be a factor in determining "proportionality.,
265
The concept of proportionality itself has been well developed in American
jurisprudence, especially in the line of cases from Pennsylvania Coal,266 through
Penn Central Transportation,267 and onto the most recent cases of Nollan268 and
Lucas.269 While the debate over proportionality still goes on in the United States
260. Shelley, 334 U.S. 1, 20-21.
261. Arrondelle v. United Kingdom (1983), 5 E.H.R.R. 118.
262. Comparing the text of Protocol I, Article I with the text of U.S. Const. amend. V, Cl. 4.
263. Comparing the text of Protocol I, Article 1, Cl 3 with Supreme Court jurisprudence such as
Hadacheck, 239 U.S. 394, which carefully distinguished regulation under the police power
from actual taking of possession of the property.
264. U.S. Const. amend. V, Cl. 4 ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.").
265. Harpum, supra note 16, at 33.
266. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. 393 (where the concept of going "too far" with a
regulation first introduced proportionality to American takings law).
267. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104 (which held that "too far" was measured by
balancing the severity of the impact on the individual with the benefit to the general
welfare).
268. Nollan, 483 U.S. 825 (where "control," a condition of approval, had to have a nexus to the
land use permission sought to avoid being a taking).
269. Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003 (where a regulation which removed all economic value was a taking,
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(as witnessed in the controversy over the Supreme Court's decision in Tahoe-
Sierra that a two and a half year moratorium on development was not a taking of
property rights),27 ° the legal reasoning in these cases should be readily adaptable
by Great Britain's judges in evaluating whether a land use control is a
disproportionate burden and a violation of the Convention under Article 1.
C. Due Process
The body of American law on the right to a fair and impartial trial goes much
further than the present state of British law under the HRA. Compared to the
British cases of Price271 and Alconbury,272 American law requires a much more
careful process of notice and independence of the hearing body. American cases
like Tumey273 and Cinderella Career274 set a much higher standard not only for the
actual independence of the tribunal but also for the appearance of that
independence. The issue of the guarantee of legal due process by means of an
independent judiciary may, in many ways, be the most difficult potential impact of
bringing the Convention into British law since it conflicts with the long standing
275doctrine of a sovereign Parliament as the peak of Great Britain's legal system.
D. Adverse Possession
The issue raised by incorporation of the Convention's protection of one's
possessions 276 is whether adverse possession can still be sustained. Basically,
adverse possession takes one party's property and gives it to another with the mere
277passage of time. This transfer of property interest by statutory action would
appear to conflict with the Articles 1 and 8 of the Convention. The legal reasoning
of cases like Texaco v. Short278 would appear to resolve the apparent conflict
the economic value was measured by what the property owner would be allowed to do
under common law concepts of nuisance and interference with others' rights in land).
270. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302 (in which three Justices dissented, including the Chief Justice).
271. Price, 1 W.L.R. 1825, 1838 (where appeal was denied allowing the lower court decision
that no notice at all was felt to be required before removing the right to occupy property to
stand).
272. R. (Alconbury), 2 A.C. 295 (where the same body that had written the law was considered
to be an adequately neutral tribunal to hear a case involving application of that law against
the interests of the affected private property owners).
273. Tumey, 273 U.S. 510.
274. Cinderella Career, 425 F.2d 583.
275. Pace, supra note 6, at 155-56.
276. Convention, Art. 1, supra note 37.
277. DUKEMINIER AND KRIER, supra note 234, at 126.
278. See Texaco, 454 U.S. 516.
592
British Property Law and Human Rights 593
between the ancient doctrine of adverse possession and Convention, and would
apply equally to Great Britain under the HRA. Reasoning that property has
meaning only as defined by the state, there is no deprivation of either possessions
or home if the state includes a time element in the definition of property.
E. Discrimination
America has an extensive body of law on the application of the constitutional
prohibitions against discrimination, particularly the Fourteenth Amendment, to
various exercises of property rights. That body of law has established two basic
criteria: first, discrimination will be upheld only if the state can show the different
treatment of the parties is necessary to achieve a substantial public purpose, 279 and
second, that there must be both a discriminatory effect and a discriminatory
intent.280 These criteria appear similar to that used by the Strasbourg court in
Chassagnou where the court suggested that the social aim of the state in
controlling property rights will be a significant factor in deciding whether a
violation of Section 14 of the Convention would be allowed.28' Because of this
similarity, the extensive American exploration of when a distinction between two
groups becomes discrimination, and when such discrimination becomes illegal
because it does not advance a legitimate government interest can be used by the
British courts as they develop their own jurisprudence.
V. Conclusion
The evolution of British land law over the next few years should be interesting
to watch as the Human Rights Act 1998, applying the European Convention on
Human Rights, begins to impact Great Britain's ancient laws of property. On one
hand, commentators like Lord Buxton may be correct that there will be little
impact since British law already includes the same precepts that are contained in
the Convention.282 On the other hand, as Sir William Wade noted, the specific
wording of the Convention, and the fact that that wording is now binding on all
official government actions, gives a different weight to those precepts than has
previously existed in British law.283 Regardless of the degree that Great Britain's
279. DUKEMINIER AND KRIER, supra note 234, at 646.
280. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977).
281. Harpum, supra note 16, at 34-5.
282. Buxton, supra note 3, at 61.
283. Wade, supra note 10, at 221.
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courts, now or in the future, are felt to be bound to the Convention, it is clear that
"incorporation of the Convention will have an effect on the way in which judges
approach issues which either directly or indirectly raise Convention points.,, 284 If
the American experience with application of constitutional rights to land law over
the past several decades is any guide, the change to British land law will be far
greater than is currently anticipated, and, in the words of the Lord Chancellor, "the
Human Rights Act will do much to reduce the gap between England and
,,285America.
284. Howell, supra note 4, at 288.
285. LORD IRVINE, supra note 18, at 224.
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